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CONFRONTING THE DEAD: THE SUPREME COURT'S (ONFRONTATION CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR AUTOPSY REPORTS
by ReidR. Allison'

I ihe past decade, the United States Supirmea Court has attempted to overhaul Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. Since the
Court's 2004 decision in Crawfordv.Washington,2
it has decided six substantive Confrontation
Clause cases. As with all drastic precedential overhauls, the Court has injected an overwhelming amount of uncertainty into questions of Confrontation Clause legality.'
This
article will examine the development of the
Crawford era of Confrontation Clause case law,
with a particular focus on one of the most difficult but pressing contexts: the admissibility of
forensic reports. In examining these reports,
particular attention will be paid to the looming
question of the admissibility of autopsy reports.
Given the development of the law including
a recent decision by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit4 the autopsy
1
Thank you to Professor Paul Rothstein, Jessica
Carter, Francis Gieringer, Paul Halliday, Michael Heckler, and
Gabriel Kurcab for their invaluable feedback on drafts of this
article. Thank you to the staff of the CriminalLaw Practi-

tioner for their tremendous work toward making this article
what you read today. Thank you to Bill Larson for believing
in me. Thank you also to Professor Steven Goldblatt for his
mentorship throughout law school and Dr. John Rubadeau for
teaching me to write and insisting that his students "scratch
their itch." Finally, I must thank my parents, Cary Rouse and
Chuck Allison, for-literally-everything and my brother,
Kyle Allison, for being a perfect older brother and inspiring
me with his writing.
2
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
3
See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012), for
the latest decision to fail in providing sufficient, meaningful
guidance.
4
United States v. Ignasiak, 667 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir.
2012).

question is very likely to come before the Su-

preme Court within the next five years. After
setting out the current landscape on the question in Part I, this article will discuss the significant problems with current precedent in Part
II, establish autopsy reports as a worthwhile
case study in Part III, and, in Part IV make predictions and argue for ways in which the Court
could and should address the autopsy report
question and clarify its Confrontation Clause
precedent in the field of forensic reports.

I.

Precedent
Clause
Confrontation
A. The CrawfordWatershed

In 2004, the Supreme Court was presented with a relatively run-of-the-mill factual
scenario.
A husband and wife gave similar
tape-recorded statements to the police after
the husband was arrested for stabbing another
man." At the husband's trial for assault and
attempted murder, he argued that the stabbing occurred in self-defense.' His wife could
not testify under the state's marital privilege
law without his consent, "so the State sought
to introduce [her] tape-recorded statement to
police" that had been recorded the night of
the incident.' The husband argued that such
admission violated his constitutional right to
confront witnesses against him: he would not
have the opportunity to cross-examine his wife
because the state's marital privilege barred her
from testifying. The trial court admitted the
5
6

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38-39 (2004).
Id. at 40.

7

Id.
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recording and the husband was convicted of
assault. After the intermediate appellate court
reversed, the Washington Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's verdict.8
Under United States Supreme Court
precedent at the time, Crawford was a relatively
easy case. Ohio .Roberts9 required that the dis-

puted evidence for which the producing witness's testimony was unavailable have adequate
"indicia of reliability," as established either by
"the evidence fall[ing] within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception," or "a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."o In Crawford, the Washington high court found that the
wife's statement included guarantees of trustworthiness in that it was identical on the central and material points to the separate statement the husband had given police regarding
the stabbing despite varying in certain other
respects." Her statement was potentially incriminating because she stated she saw nothing in the victim's hand after the victim was
stabbed, which contrasted with the defendant's
alleged belief that the victim had reached for a

weapon. 12
The Court, however, granted certiorari
on the question of whether Roberts should be
reconsidered. After briefing and argument in
favor of abandoning the Roberts standard from
the defendant, Mr. Crawford," and the United
States as amicus curiae,14 the Court did just
that. Mr. Crawford argued for a per se bar on
the admission of testimonial statements made
by a witness whom the defendant did not have
an opportunity to cross-examine. 5 On the other
8

Id. at 40-42.

9
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
10
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
11
State v. Crawford, 147 Wash. 2d 424, 437-39 (2002).
12
Id.; 541 U.S. at 38-40.
13
Brief for the Petitioner, Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 21939940.
14
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL
22228005.

15
See generally Brief for the Petitioner, Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL
21939940, at *9 (arguing that "the government may not
convict a defendant through any testimonial statements-that
is, statements given in connection with its investigation or
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol1/iss1/3
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hand, the United States asserted that Confrontation Clause is implicated only where a statement is testimonial, and argued against a per se
bar on admission in favor of admissibility when
the statement is inherently reliable. In a quintessentially Justice Scalia opinion," the Court
began its analysis by referencing Roman times
and sixteenth century England; this must have
been disconcerting for defenders of Roberts because of Justice Scalia's previous statements on
the issue.19 After thorough examination of preframing and framing era history, the Court held
that the Confrontation Clause only applies to
"testimonial" statements. 2 0 The Court, however,
did not clearly define the parameters of "testimonial," opting instead to "leave for another
day any effort to spell out a comprehensive
definition of 'testimonial.'" 21 It did stress that
"the principal evil at which the Confrontation
Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of
criminal procedure, and particularly its use of
ex parte examinations as evidence against the
accused," and contrasted these examinations
with "an off-hand, overheard remark" which
"bears little resemblance to the civil-law abuses the Confrontation Clause targeted." 22 Put
generally, the Court outlined testimonial as "[a]
solemn declaration or affirmation made for the
purpose of establishing or proving some fact," 23
prosecution - that have not been (or cannot be) subjected to
cross-examination").
16
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Crawfordv. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410), 2003
WL 22228005, at *5, 23.
17
Justice Scalia has told at least one interviewer
that Crawford is his "legacy case." See Gatan GervilleR6ache, Justice Scalia at the AJEl Summit in New Orleans,
ABAAPPELLATE ISSUES (Feb. 2013), available at http://www.

americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/appellate
issues/2013win ai.authcheckdam.pdf.
18
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43-44.
19
As early as 1992, Justice Scalia indicated that he believed the Roberts standard was incorrect based on the history
of the Confrontation Clause. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S.
346, 358 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Scalia, J.)
(proposing that "our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence has
evolved in a manner that is perhaps inconsistent with the text
and history of the Clause itself').
20
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-54.
21
Id. at 68.
22

Id. at 50-51.

23

Id. at 51 (quoting 2 N. Webster, An American Dic2
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and gave, as examples of testimonial evidence
affidavits, custodial examinations ...

deposi-

tions, prior testimony, or confessions." 24

under the Roberts standard. 2 9 The state court
had given decisive weight to the interlocking
nature of the statements and had deemed such
interlocking sufficient indicia of reliability, but
Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that such an
argument was foreclosed by Idaho 9. Wright,30
which had held that an out-of-court statement was not admissible at trial simply because
other evidence corroborated its truthfulness."

After determining that a statement's testimonial status was the touchstone of the inquiry, the Court held that, w] here testimonial
evidence is at issue . . . the Sixth Amendment
demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for crossexamination." 25 This means that, unless the
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness who created the testimonial
evidence, that evidence cannot be introduced
without the testimony of that witness. If the witness is unavailable, then the evidence is inadmissible. The Court was easily convinced that
the statement at issue was testimonial because
it was the result of police interrogation.2 6 Concurring, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor chastised the Court for "cast[ing] a
mantle of uncertainty over future criminal trials
in both federal and state courts" by needlessly
overruling Roberts while refusing to effectively
define what evidence is "testimonial."2 ' This
fear has been amply borne out by the decade
of subsequent Confrontation Clause tumult
on questions of whether a piece of evidence is
testimonial and how such evidence may still be
admitted without the testimony of the original
record-creator. The concurrence also exemplified how an argument based on "history" can be
turned into support for conflicting positions by
noting that the history points with equal force
to no formal distinction between testimonial
and non-testimonial, testimonial being limited
to sworn statements, and such statements are
not necessarily categorically excluded.2 8

Five years after Crawford, and after having decided two other Confrontation Clause
cases in the interim, 3 2 the Court was presented
for the first time with a Confrontation Clause
issue pertaining to the admissibility of a type
of forensic report. The case, Melendez-Diaz 9.
Massachusetts," involved a laboratory's chemical analysis of seized contraband. The analyst
who conducted the chemical test did not testify at trial; instead, the results were admitted
by way of "certificates of analysis" which the
analyst had sworn to before a notary public. 4
The United States, supporting the respondent Commonwealth, asserted chemical tests
should not be deemed testimonial and therefore should be admissible without the testimony of the laboratory technician who conducted
the test." In support of this proposition, the

However, Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment
because they believed that the Supreme Court
of Washington could and should be reversed

32

tionary of the English Language (1828)).
24
25

Id. at 51.
Id. at 68.

26
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 65-68 (2004)
at 65, 68.
27
Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)

B. Recent Forensic Report Cases

United States argued such test results could
not properly be deemed statements because a
machine created the results, which were merely
recorded and authenticated by humans; thus,
29
30

Id. at 76.
497 U.S. 805 (1990) (rejecting the theory that when

co-defendants' respective confessions "interlock" it is determinative of the confessions' trustworthiness).
31
Crawford,541 U.S. at 76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 361 (2008)

(holding that unconfronted testimony is inadmissible absent
a showing the defendant intended to prevent a witness from
testifying); see also Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822
(2006) (holding that statements are non-testimonial when
their primary purpose is to assist police in meeting an ongoing
emergency).
33
557 U.S. 305 (2009).
34
Id. at 308.
35
See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Sup-

porting Respondent, Melendez- Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557

28
Id. at 69-74.
U.S. 305 (2009), 2008 WL 4195142, at *5-7.
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testing machines are not witnesses in the constitutional sense.3 6
Furthermore, requiring
the technician's testimony would significantly
hamper criminal prosecutions.

of forensic reports at issue.43
As the dissent
stressed, "laboratory analysts are not 'witnesses
against' the defendant as those words would
have been understood at the framing."44 Instead, "witnesses against" contemplated conThe Court was not persuaded. Again, ventional, in-person, eyeball witnesses to
Justice Scalia wrote for the majority and pur- crimes.4
The dissent reasoned that beyond
ported to ground his decision on the bright- being unforeseeable to the Framers lab analine rule established in Crawford." Justice lysts could not be considered conventional witScalia once more asserted that his position was nesses because one, analysts record their condictated by history and applied with equal force temporaneous observations and do not rely on
to a case whose dispute resolved a scientific memory as do conventional witnesses; two, the
analysis centuries removed from the Founding analyst is ignorant regarding who is accused or
era.38 Importantly, Justice Clarence Thomas what his or her quantum of guilt may be where
provided the deciding fifth vote, but the scope conventional witnesses see a person's identity
of his agreement was very limited and came and wrongful acts; and three, the scientific proin a paragraph-long opinion. Justice Thomas tocol involved in lab tests and reports adds laystated, "I join the Court's opinion in this case ers of reliability that do not attach to convenbecause the documents at issue in this case are tional witnesses. 46 Each of these differences
quite plainly affidavits."" For Justice Thomas, convinced the dissent that the lab analysts of
only formalized testimonial materials (e.g., af- today were starkly different from conventional
fidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confes- witnesses contemplated by the Framers, both in
sions) implicate the Confrontation Clause, but terms of their reliability and adversarial nature.
the swearing procedure for the forensic report
in this case rendered it sufficiently formal.4 0
Two years later, the Court was confrontHis represented the narrowest view of 'testimo- ed with a similar Confrontation Clause quesnial' set out in Crawford,1 and thus rejected the tion. In Bullcoming 9. New Mexico, the Court
broader proposition that evidence other than considered a blood-alcohol concentration lab
affidavits or formalized materials may still be report the state tried to admit through the testestimonial.42
timony of another scientist worked at the same
lab but did not perform or observe the test and
In dissent, Justice Kennedy joined by did not sign the certification.4 ' Defense counChief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, and Jus- sel dubbed this "surrogate testimony."4
The
tice Breyer criticized the fact that the formal- Court found this report and method of introism of the forensic report cases is founded on a duction was similar enough to be governed by
"history" that could not even fathom the types
43
See
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 331 (Kennedy, J.,

36
37

See id.
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 329 (stating "[t]his case

involves little more than the application of our holding in
Crawford v. Washington").
38

See id.

39
Id. at 329 (Thomas, J., concurring) (asserting that
extrajudicial statements implicate the Confrontation Clause
only when contained in fornalized testimonials).
40
41

Id. at 329.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-2 (describing the "core"

class of testimonial statements as including affidavits and
other formalized materials).
42

See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 835-

42 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting) (decrying the Court's extension of "testimonial"
status to statements made during a 911 call).
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol1/iss1/3
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dissenting) (averring that "[t]he Court's opinion suggests this
will be a body of formalistic and wooden rules, divorced from
precedent, common sense, and the underlying purpose of the
[Confrontation] Clause").
44
Id. at 343 (observing the concerns of treating analysts as conventional witnesses; for example, the analyst must
be in court for his or her findings to be considered by the jury).
45
Id. at 343-44 (arguing that the Confrontation Clause
applies only to witnesses who have personal knowledge of the
defendant's guilt, not to evidence analysts).
46

Id. at 345-46.

47
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710
(2011) (noting that the New Mexico Supreme Court determined live testimony of another analyst satisfied the Confrontation Clause).
48
Petitioner's Brief, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131
S. Ct. 2705 (2011), 2010 WL 4913553, *10.
4
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Melendez-Diaz, and then held that the type of
surrogate testimony attempted here by a "scientist who had neither observed nor reviewed"
the testing technician's work was insufficient
to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.49 Bullcoming did not, however, foreclose the possibility
of acceptable 'surrogate' testimony. Indeed,
Justice Sotomayor's concurrence, representing
the necessary fifth vote, seemed to deliberately
pave the way for such testimony to be deemed
sufficient in future cases; she stressed that it
"would be a different case if, for example, a supervisor who observed an analyst conducting a
test testified about the results or a report about
such results."o She also noted, presaging W1il-

dence as well as to subpoena the test-conducting lab technician to testify."" Additionally, the
defendant benefitted from "testing by an independent agency; routine process performed en
masse, which reduce ... targeted bias; and labs

operating pursuant to scientific and professional norms and oversight."" Furthermore, the
dissent decried that "the Crawford line of cases
has treated the reliability of evidence as a reason to exclude it," by concentrating on formality while formality tends to support reliability,
Crawfordand its progeny have determined that
formality of a statement leads to testimonial
status, which in turn leads to exclusion.

testimonial report that was not itself admitted
into evidence. 1

Finally, last year, the Court decided its
most recent forensic report case. In Williams 9.
Illinois, the Court considered the admissibility
of expert testimony that was based on a DNA

In dissent, Justice Kennedy again
joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Breyer,
and Justice Alito noted that his arguments
from Melendez-Diaz applied with equal force
to this case and that other reasons particular to
Bullcoming also weighed against the majority's
decision.52 The dissent lamented that extending
Melendez-Diaz would cause more problems for
state prosecutions and exhaust state resources.53
For example, the dissent noted a 71% increase
in subpoenas for analyst testimony in DUI cases

technician who did not testify." The testifying
lab technician created a DNA profile of the defendant; the non-testifying technician had tested physical evidence from the rape evidence to
derive DNA material and create a different profile, to which the testifying technician matched
her profile."9 Crucially, the report "was neither
admitted into evidence nor shown to the factfinder. [The testifying lab technician] did not
quote or read from the [other technician's] report; nor did she identify it as the source of any

after Melendez-Diaz, which caused analysts to

of the opinions she expressed."6o

liams . Illinois,that this was not a case in which
an expert gave an independent opinion on a

matching test that had been performed by a lab

have to travel great distances to testify in court
In an intensely fractured set of opinon most working days and hindered laboratory
54
ions,
the
plurality was comprised of Chief
efficiency and productivity.
The dissent also believed it was unnecessary to apply Melendez-Diaz to this case because
of the continued availability of certain safeguards.
One such safeguard was the defendant's ability to obtain free re-testing of the physical evi49
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2713 (holding that out-ofcourt testimonials may not be introduced against the accused
at trial unless the witness is unavailable and the accused had
the opportunity to confront him or her in the past).
50

Id. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

51

Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

Justice Roberts along with Justices Kennedy,
Alito, and Breyer the dissenting bloc from
both ielendez-Diaz and Bullcoming. The plurality, authored by Justice Alito, had two foundations for its opinion. First, Justice Alito determined the testimony was not introduced for the
truth of the matter that is, the veracity of the
DNA test conducted by the non-testifying technician and thus the Confrontation Clause was

55
Id. at 2726-27.
56
Id. at 2727.
52
See id. at 2723 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
57
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2725
53
Id. at 2726-28 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (detailing
(2011) at 2725.
evidence of the heavy burdens imposed on prosecutors as a
58
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2223 (2012).
result of the Court's Confrontation Clause holdings).
59
See id. at 2229-30.
54
Id. at 2727-28.
60
Id. at 2230.
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not implicated." The plurality highlighted the
facts that the testifying technician only testified
to relying on the other lab's DNA profile, made it
clear that she had not conducted the test herself
and could not speak from personal knowledge
to its veracity, and merely properly assumed the
prosecutor's premise regarding the other lab's

DNA profile.62
The plurality also stressed that the report in question was "neither admitted into
evidence nor shown to the factfinder,"" while
in both Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, "[c]ritically, the report was introduced at trial for the
substantive purpose of proving the truth of the
matter asserted."6 4 Furthermore, the fact that
this case was presented before a judge rather
than a jury saved it from potential jury instruction impossibilities." There was no need to
rely on a jury's understanding and application
of the fact that the DNA expert's testimony was
not to be understood as going to the reliability
of the other technician's DNA profile or its origin in the physical evidence.
Second, Justice Alito argued that the
Court had only applied the Confrontation
Clause in cases where the statement/report had
"the primary purpose of accusing [a]targeted
individual of engaging in criminal conduct.""
Here, the DNA test of the vaginal swab was not
61

See id. at 2240 (averring that there is simply no way

around the fact that under Crawford,the Confrontation Clause
applies only to out-of-court statements used to establish the
truth of the matter asserted).
62

See id. at 2235-37 (asserting that the lab technician's

presumption was taken as substantive evidence to establish
where DNA profiles came from).
63

Id. at 2230.

64

See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2223.

conducted with a specific suspect in mind the
defendant was not in custody or even under
suspicion for the rape" nor did the conducting lab have any idea whether the results of the
test would inculpate or exculpate anyone." In
light of these realities, "there was no 'prospect
of fabrication' and no incentive to produce anything other than a scientifically sound and reliable profile."o
Justice Breyer concurred to express his
desire that the case be reargued on general
1
questions of the limit of Crawford."
Justice
Breyer was (and likely remains) very concerned
with the Court's unwillingness to grapple with
defining what evidence is and is not testimonial
and what factors are involved in this determination.7 2 He insisted that answering this question was of utmost importance in order to give
courts real guidance regarding a massive swath
of their dockets: criminal cases, including those
that involve lab reports." In the absence of reargument, Justice Breyer would have held that
the DNA report was not testimonial, because
it was conducted by technicians of an accredited lab who were behind a veil of ignorance
as to the origin of the sample and the purposes
for which the result may be used 4 a rationale
somewhat akin to Justice Alito's targeted criminal suspect requirement.
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment (and was the necessary vote for the result)
but did not join the plurality's opinion. As ever,
Justice Thomas's conception of the Confrontation Clause remained the narrowest of the nine
justices as he held that the DNA report in question, though admitted here for the truth of the

65
See id. at 2236 (proposing that "there would have
been a danger of the jury's taking [the] testimony as proof that
the [other lab's DNA] profile was derived from the sample
obtained from the victim's vaginal swabs. Absent ... careful jury instructions, the testimony could not have gone to the
jury").

68
69
70

66
See id. at 2236-37 (stating that "this case involves
... a bench trial, and we must assume that the trial judge

71

understood that the portion of .. . testimony to which the dissent objects was not admissible to prove the truth of the matter
asserted").
67

Id. at 2242 (finding that the Confrontation Clause ap-

plies to formalized testimony by witnesses against an accused
that directly links him to the crime alleged).
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol1/iss1/3
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Id. at 2242-44.
Id. at 2243-44.
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2224 (avowing that the Con-

frontation Clause did not apply because there was no risk of
malice or fabrication in the collection of the scientific evidence).
Id. at 2247 (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing the

various approaches to applying the Confrontation Clause
which would be more compatible with Crawford).
72

See id. at 2244-45 (contemplating "what, if any, are

the outer limits of the 'testimonial statements' rule set forth in
Crawford").
73
74

Id. at 2248.
Id. at 2249-52.

6

Allison: Confronting the Dead: The Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause Ju

Criminal Law Practitioner
matter asserted, was not testimonial because
it was unsworn and not otherwise formalized
enough to be testimonial.' Justice Thomas explicitly disagreed with the plurality's "accusing
a targeted individual" requirement for testimonial status after finding no grounds for it in the
text and history of the Confrontation Clause.

the parameters of the newly-crowned operative
term, "testimonial." Crawford conceded that

Justice Kagan, writing in dissent along
with Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor,
viewed this case as a straightforward application of4elendez-Diaz and Bullcoming,77 going so
far as to ask, "Have we not already decided this
case?"" To the plurality's first argument, the
dissent responded that what the plurality had
signed off on was the functional equivalent of
the surrogacy rejected in Bullcoming namely,
the Court allowed an expert to testify regarding
an inadmissible, Confrontation Clause-deficient fact of which she had no personal knowledge. To the plurality's second argument, the
dissent stated that the "primary purpose" test
had never required particularized suspicion
regarding a targeted individual," there was
no reason to add such requirement,80 and the
Court had faced and rejected similar arguments
of the reliability of forensic reports in 4elendezDiaz and Bullcoming." Summing up the opinions, Justice Kagan stated, "What comes out of
four Justices' desire to limit4elendez Diaz and
Bullcoming in whatever way possible, combined

is any criminal suspect or even suspicion of a
crime could possibly be deemed testimonial.
Indeed, the Court seemed to leave open that,
beyond the largely undefined "core" of testimonial statements (e.g., affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, etc.), there may be other forms of
statements, which could be deemed testimonial
for Confrontation Clause purposes.8 4 While
the Court certainly could not have conclusively
defined the field regarding the new standard
in the genesis case, its reliance on history as
a crutch has made the forensic report cases
where history has only the vaguest and most attenuated relevance all the more confused.

with one Justice's one-justice view of those
holdings, is to be frank who knows what."82

It. Analysis and Critiques of Case Law
As Justice Kagan rightly noted, it is anyone's guess what will become of Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence in the area of forensic reports; however, this problem existed long before
the Court's decision in W1illiams. In terms of
guidance, a major shortcoming of the Crawford

there could be many, widely varying formulations of testimonial."

However, as discussed

above, the case did not begin to answer many

important questions. For example, Crawforddid
not address whether less formal conversations
with police or statements made before there

In the forensic report context, the confusion began with the very first case. MelendezDiaz asked whether a report needed formal
swearing to be deemed testimonial. 5 Crawford
seemingly resolved this question by noting that
historically, "the absence of oath was not dispositive" and the statement made against Sir
Walter Raleigh, (the "paradigmatic confrontation violation") was unsworn."

However, Jus-

tice Thomas was the fifth vote in Melendez-Diaz
and rested entirely on his determination that
the reports at issue were sworn affidavits.

opinion was that it did almost nothing to define
75
Id. at 2258-61 (Thomas, J., concurring).
76
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2262-64 (Thomas, J., concur-

Thus, after Melendez-Diaz, this question
had significant potential ramifications, because
if Justice Thomas's very formal view triumphed
(a dubious proposition considering the contrary views of at least seven other justices), the
definition of "testimonial" would have been
quite limited. Perversely, testimonial status could
be avoided by not having certain reports sworn,
and would he very easily dispatched by simply

ring).

83

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.

77

Id. at 2266 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

84

See id.

78
79
80

Id. at 2267.
See id. at 2273.
See id. at 2274.

85
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527,
2543 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring).

81

See id. at 2274-75 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

87
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring).

86

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.

82
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2277.
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examining the face of the report in question.
Under this regime, much of the subsequent
case law would not have reached the merits
stage in the Supreme Court.

subsequently utilized by the plurality in Williams, though Justice Sotomayorjoined the dissent in that case.

However, Bull-

Second, she noted that the Court may
that whether a forensic report is sworn or un- have decided the case differently if the state
coming dispatched this possibility by holding
sworn is not determinative in the testimonial
analysis.88

had "suggested ...

an alternate primary pur-

pose," such as the blood-alcohol report being
"necessary to provide ... medical treatment."92
The Court, though, proceeded to leave This strain of argument remains uncertain after
open a potentially larger avenue for admission. Williams, as the Court has yet to grapple with
Though it struck down the variety of "surrogate a case in which it finds multiple primary purtestimony" present in Bullcoming, the majority's poses (e.g., one for use in a criminal proceeding
opinion89 as well as Justice Sotomayor's fifth- and one for non-criminal reasons). However,
vote concurrence, made clear that the surro- the concept of an "alternate primary purpose"
gate theory was not dead. Justice Sotomayor's is arguably internally contradictory as the word
opinion leaves the potential parameters of such "primary" is defined as "of first rank, importestimony completely open to question by stat- tance, or value," 3 which indicates that there can
ing, "we need not address what degree of in- be only one truly primary purpose for testimovolvement [by a testifying surrogate in the fo- nial evidence. Williams perhaps raises the most
rensic report at issue] is sufficient."9 0 Justice questions of any of the three cases, all while
Sotomayor's concurrence and the majority's leaving the surrogacy issue as open as Justice
carefully drafted language arguably left open Sotomayor left it. The jumble of opinions in
potentially acceptable surrogate testimony, in- this case is incredibly difficult to comprehend,
cluding: the testimony of a supervisor who has and it remains somewhat unclear how they will
internal oversight authority for the unavailable be read to include or form a coherent precedent
technician who conducted the test; testimony that can be cohesively followed. Regarding
of a peer or subordinate technician who ob- Justice Alito's plurality opinion, it is unclear to
served the particular test; and designation of what extent the nuanced and complicated "not
a lone technician or group of technicians who for the truth of the matter asserted" rationale
would observe the forensic tests and become would apply in a jury trial setting.9 4 Justice Alito made clear that he was relying on the fact
experts at testifying as to the reports.
that this was a bench trial to convince himself
Justice Sotomayor's opinion in Bullcom- that the nuanced admission of the evidence
ing also left open two other potential avenues was fully understood by the finder of fact.95
to avoid Confrontation Clause inadmissibility. The legal acumen required in even this relaFirst, she hinted at the possibility that "an ex- tively straightforward evidentiary issue makes
pert witness [being] asked for his independent it appear unlikely that a jury instruction could
opinion about underlying testimonial reports
that were not themselves admitted into evidence," may still be permissible under Federal

92
93

Rule of Evidence 703,9' which regards bases of
expert opinion testimony. This rationale was

Dec. 12, 2013).

88

Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2716-

17 (2011).

89
See id. at 2710 (phrasing carefully the question
regarding the testimony of a scientist "who did not sign the
certification or perform or observe the test") (emphasis added);
see also id. at 2712 (phrasing the facts as involving a "scientist
who had neither observed nor reviewed" the test in question).
90
Id. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
91

Id.
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PrimaryDefinition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://

www.meiam-webster.com/dictionaiy/priimary (last visited
94
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2236 (proposing that "[t]he
dissent's argument would have force if petitioner had elected
to have a jury trial. In that event, there would have been a
danger of the jury's taking [the lab technician's] testimony as
proof that the [other lab's] profile was derived from the sample
obtained from the victim's vaginal swabs").
95

Id. at 2236-37 (asserting that "this case ... involves

a bench trial,and we must assume that the trial judge understood" for which purposes the evidence was admissible and
for which it was inadmissible) (emphasis in original).
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properly cure potential Confrontation Clause
risks, such as the DNA expert's testimony being
used for the veracity or reliability of the swab
test. Indeed, Justice Alito conceded that such
an argument would have force in the jury trial
context,96 because a jury may not be able to understand and follow such nuanced (and arguably "factually implausible") legal arguments
even with the most careful of instructions. Additionally, even before the Williams opinions
were handed down, commentators who rightly
predicted the outcome stressed that the Court
would need to provide clear guidance on "the
nature and quantum of independent judgment and independent basis which is required
to permit testimony of an expert predicated in
part upon the forensic report compiled by another analyst."98 Unfortunately, the plurality
did no such thing, and these questions remain
as unclear as before.
Of even more potential import is Justice
Alito's second theory namely that the Confrontation Clause is only triggered by statements/tests that are elicited or conducted when
law enforcement has a particular target in a
criminal investigation.99 If this rationale were
to find a fifth vote at some point, it could be
of incredible significance not just for DNA test
cases, but also in many autopsy report cases
where the autopsy was conducted before there
was any criminal suspicion at all.
Of course, the woefully unhelpful nature
of these opinions is largely the result of a Court
irreconcilably divided against itself: between
dogged adherence to "history" on the one
hand (exemplified best by Justices Scalia and
96

Id. at 2236 (noting that "absent an evaluation of the

risk of juror confusion and careful jury instructions, the case
could not have gone to the jury").
97

Id. at 2269 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (asserting that

"the principal modem treatise on evidence variously calls the
idea that such 'basis evidence' comes in not for its truth, but
only to help the factfinder evaluate an expert's opinion 'very
weak,' 'factually implausible,' 'nonsense,' and 'sheer fiction"')
(quoting D. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE
§ 4.10.1, at 196-97 (2d ed. 2011)).
98
Ronald Coleman & Paul Rothstein, Grabbingthe
Bullcoming by the Horns, 90 NEB. L. REv. 502, 542 (2011)
[hereinafter Grabbingthe Bullcoming].

A

Thomas) and a more realistic and pragmatic approach (exemplified by the dissenting bloc of
Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Alito, Breyer, and Kennedy). However, at this point the
Court must be fully aware of this divide, and it
ought to no longer act so cavalierly in this area.
The Court should be especially careful
in granting certiorari in its next Confrontation Clause case granting certiorari without
a willingness to resolve important questions of
law serves neither criminal defendants nor the
state's prosecutions. Rather, it heightens the
degree of unpredictability in each new, slightly
different factual situation. For example, after
Williams, prosecutors may believe they are constitutionally safe where the statement occurred
before there was any criminal suspicion; they
thus may attempt to craft some form of permissible surrogate testimony through a supervisor
or other informed party, or they may argue that
the report in question had an alternate primary
purpose other than preparation for a criminal trial. Any of these efforts may be perfectly
well intentioned and optimally protective of all
interests involved, and yet it is far from clear

which, if any, would be acceptable.
Part I of this paper will present the most
likely methods for the state to introduce autopsy reports without the testimony of the medical
examiner who conducted the autopsy, discuss
the pros and cons of each way forward, and analyze the relative likelihood of success of each
method in the Supreme Court. But first, Part
III will detail the development of Confrontation
Clause as related to autopsy reports and discuss how this field may provide an opportunity
for the Court to clarify its Confrontation Clause

jurisprudence as applied to forensic reports.
III. Autopsy as Case Study
Autopsy reports are a useful subset
of forensic reports for Confrontation Clause
purposes because they are very important to
a prosecution's case, are typically involved in
cases resulting in death, meaning the public has
the greatest interest in effective prosecution,
and the Supreme Court will likely be dealing
with the question within the next few terms.

99
See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2242-44.
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An autopsy report differs materially from almost any other forensic report, and certainly
from any the Court has considered. Importantly, in cases like Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, the police have the identity of the criminal suspect, and he or she is the source of the
physical evidence is tested. On the other hand,
autopsy reports in murder situations are not
always tied to a suspect; instead, autopsies are
performed to establish the cause of death or to
add detail to a police recreation of the incident
that led to the murder. Like the vaginal swab
in Williams, the source of the physical evidence
tested is the victim rather than the perpetrator.
A. The Particular Importance and Unique
Challenges of the Autopsy
The fact that the source of the physical

evidence tested is the victim rather than the
perpetrator is important for both legal and policy reasons. First, and foremost, it means that
autopsy reports are nowhere near as automatically attached to a swift prosecution and trial
as the types of report present in Melendez-Diaz,
Bullcoming, and Williams. In the first two cases,
once the report was completed, prosecutors essentially had everything necessary to bring a
case against the suspect, and there was little to
no danger of significant delay between the test
and the date of testimony. In contrast, murder
investigations can lay dormant for long periods
of time before a suspect is pinpointed and captured. In most cases, the existence of the autopsy will not further significantly the effort to
discover the wrongdoer; it typically reveals only
the cause of death, not necessarily the identity of any person who may have contributed
to the death. Second, the above problem is
compounded by the fact that autopsy reports
are not repeatable in the same way that most
other forensic reports are. In the other forensic report cases, the tested evidence is often
preserved and may be retested at a later date.
This availability mitigates some of the
concern that the death of a particular scientist may render vital evidence inadmissible; indeed, this has been noted in Melendez-Diazon

and Bullcoming.101

that the harsh consequences for prosecutions
attendant to barring introduction of these reports are significantly diminished where the
physical evidence remains available and viable
to be retested and admitted into evidence with
the testimony of the second tester. For example in drug test cases, a sample of the drugs are
typically kept through trial so there is physical
evidence to present, and that evidence will not
degrade and may be retested to solve potential
Confrontation Clause problems.
However, the Court correctly observed
that such alternatives are simply not available
when dealing with autopsy reports. 102 This
had led commentators to caution that barring
introduction of autopsy reports could in effect
create a statute of limitations for murder 03 a
patently unacceptable result as indicated by the
fact that states normally do not have a statute of
limitations for murder.104
Finally, of all forensic reports, autopsy
reports may provide the starkest illustration of
how uncertainty in Confrontation Clause doctrine can have significantly negative effects on
our system of criminal prosecution. Whereas,
the three cases decided thus far respectively
arose out of serious drug crimes and a heinous
rape, cases in which the prosecution seeks to
introduce an autopsy, as evidence will involve a
criminal act or omission that resulted in death.
These are precisely the kind of crimes for which
the public reserves the utmost condemnation
and prosecutors have the greatest desire and
incentive to prosecute. Because of the importance of effective prosecution of these crimes,
it is vitally important to establish ways to admit
autopsy reports even when the opportunity to
cross-examine is not available. Such an argu101
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See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2718.

102
See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2536 (stating that
"[s]ome forensic analyses, such as autopsy reports ... cannot

be repeated, and the specimens used for other analyses have
often been lost or degraded").
103
Grabbingthe Bullcoming, supra note 98, at 546
(quoting Carolyn Zabrycki, TowardA Definition of "Testimonial: " How Autopsy Reports Do Not Embody the Qualities of

a Testimonial Statement, 96 CAF. L. REv. 1093, 1115 (2008)).
104

100
See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536.
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol1/iss1/3
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See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 425 F.3d 400, 409

(7th Cir. 2005).
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ment does not inexorably require diminution medical examiner who conducted the autopsy.
or sacrifice of defendant's rights at the altar of Examples abound of the unavailability of mediprosecution; rather, it argues in favor of other, cal examiners from retirement, significant

equally-protective procedures beyond crossexamination that would still allow for introduction of a properly conducted and recorded autopsy report.

moves, 106 medical conditions,0 7 or death and
the fact that many murder prosecutions take
place years after the autopsy is conducted only
heightens these risks.

In analyzing this issue, the current legal
On the other hand, autopsy reports may
backdrop
(including the ebbs and flows follownecessitate detailed testimony more often than
the tests conducted in Melendez-Diaz, Bull- ing each Supreme Court decision) of the aucoming, and Williams. In each of those cases, topsy issue will be examined.
the test at issue was conducted by use of soFinally, this article will suggest possible
phisticated machines according to a rote and
straightforward procedure. These machines, methods for introducing such evidence withwith minimal input from the humans operating out the testimony of the medical examiner that
them, produced a straightforward answer to a conducted the autopsy.
relatively simple question. 10 In Melendez-Diaz,
the machine revealed whether the substance
was an illegal drug; in Bullcoming, the machine
showed whether the defendant's blood alcohol
concentration above the legal limit; in Williams,
it revealed whether there was a DNA match.
Less simple and straightforward, autopsies
rely heavily on the expertise and experiential
inferences of the conducting medical examiner. Furthermore, autopsies do not necessarily produce a definitive or simple answer to the
question of cause of death. This counterargument counsels in favor of having the conducting examiners testify whenever it is reasonably
feasible. However, the complexity of autopsies
should not be subject to the draconian bar the
Court has erected to admission, when, for example, the conducting examiner has died in the
interim or his or her whereabouts are actually

unknown to the prosecution.

Murder pros-

ecutions and the centrality of autopsy reports
to them are simply too important to be left to
the happenstance of when a suspect is found
and prosecuted, let alone the significant risk of
a material change in the circumstances of the
105
But see Paul F. Rothstein & Ronald J. Cohen, Williams v. Illinois and the Confrontation Clause: Does Testimony by a Surrogate Witness Violate the Confrontation Clause,
at n. 1, (Dec. 6,2011), availableathttp://scholarship.law.george-

town.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1740&context=facpub
(noting, in a piece featuring a debate between the authors, the
myriad complications that can arise even with mechanical forensic testing, and arguing that forensic testers have their own
self-interest, namely, to prove that theirjob requires significant
expertise and machines do not do the lion's share of the work).

B. Post-Crawford Autopsy Case Law
Two years after Crawford overhauled
the Confrontation Clause analysis, the Second
Circuit confronted the newly important question of whether autopsy reports are testimonial
such that they must be barred in the absence of
cross-examination of the conducting medical
examiner.108 In UnitedStates . Feliz, the Second
Circuit panel confronted a case in which nine
autopsy reports had been admitted in a homicide prosecution without the testimony of the
conducting medical examiner. The defendant
had run a violent drug distribution organization, but the autopsies were conducted without
targeting a specific individual for suspicion.
On appeal of his conviction, the defendant did
not challenge the District Court's decision that
the autopsy reports were admissible as business records. 109 Instead he argued that Crawford rendered the autopsy reports inadmissible
as testimonial evidence submitted without the
opportunity to cross-examine the medical examiner that had conducted the autopsies and
106
See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 740 F. Supp. 2d
4, 6 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting autopsy-conducting medical examiner had moved overseas).
107
See, e.g., Nardi v. Pepe, 662 F.3d 107, 109 (1st Cir.
2011) (explaining that the autopsy-conducting medical examiner had retired to Florida and could not testify at trial due to a
medical condition).

108
UnitedStates v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 229 (2d Cir.
2006).
109
Id. at 230.
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drafted the reports. The panel first found that
"the sole relevant inquiry under the Confrontation Clause is whether the autopsy reports
are testimonial," 1 0 and that labeling the reports
as a business record without inquiry into testimonial status would not be sufficient."

Second Circuit's admission that parties would
reasonably expect autopsy reports to be used at
trial could be fatal to this rule's continued vitality, as this statement tends to indicate that the

The Second Circuit then held that a
properly admitted business record "cannot be
testimonial because a business record is fundamentally inconsistent with what the Supreme
Court has suggested comprise the defining
characteristics of testimonial evidence."1 12 In
reaching this conclusion, the panel reasoned
that business records "cannot be made in anticipation of litigation" and thus "bear[] little resemblance to the civil-law abuses the Confrontation Clause targeted.""
In holding that the
autopsy reports were not testimonial, the panel
noted that the reports were "reports kept in the
course of a regularly conducted business activity; the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner
of New York conducts thousands of routine autopsies every year, without regard to the likelihood of their use at trial."1 14

The First Circuit also addressed the
question after Crawford but before MelendezDiaz andBullcoming "' InDeLa Cruz, the panel
was confronted with a challenge to the admissibility of an autopsy in a case in which drug
distribution allegedly resulted in the death of
one of the drug buyers."' The testifying medical examiner had not conducted the autopsy
in question, but rather based his testimony on
the autopsy report, crime scene photographs,
and a general review of the whole investigative
record. 120 The court agreed with the Second
Circuit reasoning, "[A] n autopsy report is made
in the ordinary course of business by a medical examiner who is required by law to memorialize what he or she saw and did during an
autopsy;" the report thus was admissible as a

Interestingly (particularly after Williams), the court admitted, "Certainly, practical
norms may lead a medical examiner reasonably
to expect autopsy reports may be available for
use at trial, but this practical expectation alone
cannot be dispositive on the issue of whether
those reports are testimonial.""" The panel
justified this apparent logical conflict by stating,
"Given that the Supreme Court did not opt for
an expansive definition that depended on a declarant's expectations, we are hesitant to do so
here.""
In light of subsequent Confrontation
Clause precedent particularly the development of the "primary purpose" inquiry11
the

The business record exception noted
in and relied on (to varying degrees) by Feliz
and De La Cruz no longer ends the analysis, as
the Melendez-Diaz Court made clear. There, the
Court asserted, "Business and public records
are generally admissible absent confrontation not because they qualify under an exception to the hearsay rules, but because having
been created for the administration of an entity's affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial they are
not testimonial." 122 The Feliz reasoning may
retain some life because it relied on the Supreme Court's general interpretations of "testimonial" rather than the blanket business re-

110
Id.
111
Id. at 233-34, n.4.
112
Id. at 233-34.
113
Id. at 234 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 50 (2004)).
114
United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 236 (2d Cir.
2006) (internal citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
115
Id. at 235.
116
Id. at 236.
117
See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S.
305, 312 n. 12 (2009) (excluding "medical reports created for
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol1/iss1/3
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primary purpose of autopsies in homicide cases
is for use in a subsequent criminal proceeding.

non-testimonial business record. 12 1

treatment purposes" from testimonial status); Bullcoming v.
New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2722 (2011) (Sotomayor, J.,

concurring) (hinting that a primary purpose argument could
have rendered the blood alcohol report non-testimonial).
118
United States v. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d 121 (1st Cir.
2008).

119
Id. at 125-27.
120
Id. at 132.
121
Id. at 133 (asserting that "business records are expressly excluded from the reach of Crawford").
122
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 324.
12
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cord exception used by the First Circuit, which
the Melendez-Diaz passage specifically sought
to clarify. The Feliz court noted that merely
labeling evidence as a business record was not
sufficient to exclude it from testimonial status, and it instead embarked on a searching
discussion of what the Supreme Court meant
by "testimonial" and how it applied to autopsies. For this definitional argument to retain
any strength, a reviewing court would have to
distinguish autopsy reports from the chemical
test conducted in Melendez-Diaz and the blood
alcohol concentration test from Bullcoming, because each of those varieties of forensic reports
have clearly been deemed testimonial. How-

tify subjecting them to lesser scrutiny." 12 6 The
court then looked to the state's autopsy statute

to bolster the proposition that autopsy reports
in Florida are testimonial. Most notably, the
court considered certain reporting requirements between law enforcement and medical

examiners1 27 that may not exist in the same way
in every jurisdiction.

Finally, cutting back in the non-testimonial direction, the Supreme Court of Illinois
recently decided that an autopsy was non-testimonial and admissible without the testimony
of the conducting medical examiner. 128
The

court examined a case in which an autopsy reever strong Feliz may be in a broad legal sense, port was introduced, without the testimony of
it may be undermined on its facts, because the the medical examiner, to help prove intentionautopsies were conducted following homicides al homicide after the defendant had admitted
his wife but claimed it was an acciand, as noted above, were likely carried out for to killing
129
dent.
When
the autopsy was conducted, the
the primary purpose of providing evidence at a
future trial. Autopsy reports in this context are state had criminal suspicion and a particular,
targeted suspect. The court detailed the signifilikely testimonial.
cant rift in authority between the states on this
Early last year, the Eleventh Circuit ad- question, but determined that the autopsy in
dressed the autopsy question with the added this case was not testimonial. First, the court
benefit of the Supreme Court's decisions in noted that autopsy reports are "not usually preMelendez-Diaz and Bullcoming.123 Ignasiak in- pared for the sole purpose of litigation,"130 and
volved a doctor convicted of illegally dispens- the "primary purpose of preparing an autopsy
ing controlled substances. Autopsy reports had report is not to accuse a targeted individual
been admitted some with and some without of engaging in criminal conduct.""' Next, the
the testimony of the conducting medical ex- court contrasted the autopsy with a DNA match
aminer to show that the doctor was provid- in stating that "the autopsy report did not diing controlled substances in unnecessary or rectly accuse [the] defendant." Other evidence
excessive quantities without a legitimate medi- was required to tie the defendant to the parcal purpose and that such dispensation had re- ticular body; all the autopsy proved was that
sulted in the deaths of some of his patients.124
the death was in fact a homicide. 1 32 Even in
The autopsy reports were performed
pursuant to Florida state statute and were carried out before the investigation into the doctor's practice began. 1 25 The court relied heavily on Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming to issue
blanket statements such as "forensic reports
constitute testimonial evidence," and "the scientific nature of forensic reports does not jus123
United States v. Ignasiak, 667 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir.
2012).
124
Id. 667 F.3d at 1219.
125
See generally Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee United
States, United States v. Ignasiak, 667 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir.
2012), 2009 WL 5635077.

cases where "the police suspect foul play and
the medical examiner's office is aware of this
suspicion, an autopsy might reveal that the deceased died of natural causes and, thus, exon126
Ignasiak,667 F.3d at 1230.
127
Id. at 1231-32 (citing Fla. St. § 406.13, which
requires the medical examiner to "notify the appropriate law
enforcement agency" upon receipt of a dead body to be autopsied).
128
People v. Leach, 980 N.E.2d 570 (Ill. 2012).
129
Id. at 572-73.
130
Id. at 592.
131
Id. (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. at 2242
(2012) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
132
Leach, 980 N.E.2d at 592.
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crate a suspect."'
Finally, the court advanced
an imminently reasonable, though almost entirely pragmatic, rationale: "the potential for a
lengthy delay between the crime and its prosecution could severely impede the cause of
justice if routine autopsy reports were deemed
testimonial merely because the cause of death
is determined to be homicide."1 34

The Illinois

Supreme Court's holding in People v. Leach is
not terribly convincing. It leans heavily on the
Williams' plurality "targeting" rationale even
though that rationale did not win five votes in

IV Analysis and Possible Ways Forward
This article proposes that the Confrontation Clause holdings are trending in the
wrong direction. Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming appear to have convinced some courts that
all varieties of forensic reports are testimonial,
regardless of the actual circumstances or the
comparable import of the reports. Indeed,

even in Second Circuit trial courts, where Feliz
remains good law, there is uncertainty about its

continued vitality after Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming.'39 Leach, the recent Illinois decision,
will likely spur further development of the is-

the United States Supreme Court. Furthermore,
in Leach, there was a targeted individual the
husband
when the autopsy was conducted. sue in state and federal courts, eventually leadWhat Leach will likely do, though, is speed up ing to a well-defined split of authority involving
the development of Confrontation Clause ques- many jurisdictions, making it ripe for Supreme
tions regarding autopsies in the lower courts, Court review.
and may ultimately encourage the Supreme
There are a few ways forward when the
Court to clarify the issue.
Court is eventually confronted with the issue.
First,
it is important to separate the potential
As of the time this article was written,
Missouri,3 " Texas,' and the Eleventh"' and situations in which autopsy reports may be inD.C."' Circuits have held that autopsy reports troduced. This is necessary, because the legal
(conducted under the circumstances set out in grounds for admitting autopsy reports may dithe corresponding footnotes) are deemed testi- verge significantly between the three broadly
monial for Confrontation Clause purposes. On framed groups of cases. These three situations
the other hand, as discussed above, Illinois and are: one, cases in which the autopsy is conductthe First and Second Circuits appear to hold that ed without particularized criminal suspicion,
autopsy reports are not testimonial, relying on a but is conducted instead under a non-criminal
business record rationale that may be on shaky provision of a state's autopsy statute (e.g., Ignafooting afterielendez-DiazandBullcoming. De- siak); two, cases in which law enforcement have
pending on how the Supreme Court approach- criminal suspicion but no suspect (e.g., Feliz);
es the issue, these decisions could be reconcil- and three, cases in which law enforcement have
able; however, if the Court seeks a categorical, criminal suspicion and a suspect prior to or
bright-line rule, rather than a case-by-case de- contemporaneous with the autopsy (e.g., Leach
termination, it will have to choose between the and DeLa Cruz).
two alternatives put forth by the lower courts.
The Eleventh Circuit in Ignasiak suf-

was testimonial).

ficiently illustrated the first set of cases. In a
non-homicide context, this case provides a perfect example of how harmful a strict and unreflective application of the Confrontation Clause
to bar the introduction of autopsy reports can
be. There is a strong argument that such an
autopsy report is not testimonial. Autopsy reports conducted in cases before there is suspicion of any criminal wrongdoing are typically

137

conducted pursuant to state law requiring au-

133
134

Id. at 591.
Id. at 592.

135
State v. Davidson, 242 S.W.3d 409, 417 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2007) (holding that autopsy performed at request of law

enforcement is testimonial).
136
Martinez v. State, 311 S.W.3d 104, 111 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2010) (holding that autopsy at which law enforcement
took pictures and which was conducted pursuant to statute
because death was suspected to be caused by unlawful means
Ignasiak,667 F.3d at 1229-30.

138
United States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30, 73 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (holding autopsy requested by law enforcement and attended by law enforcement to be testimonial).
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol1/iss1/3
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See, e.g., Vega v. Walsh, 2010 WL 2265043, *4

(E.D.N.Y. May 28, 2010).
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topsy reports in certain situations even before
any sort of criminal component exists. State
statutes provide many reasons to conduct autopsies that extend well beyond obvious cir-

cumstances of criminal wrongdoing.140 In each
of the state statutes listed below that provide for
autopsy in the public interest or at the discretion of the medical examiner, there are alternative grounds for explicit criminal suspicion-related autopsies, including autopsies conducted
at the request of the prosecutor's office. Clearly,
then, there is significant room in state statutes
for autopsies to be conducted in cases without criminal suspicion. If the autopsy reports
were conducted years before the underlying
criminal investigation even began, it strains
credulity to claim that the autopsy reports were

somehow conducted with a primary purpose
for use in litigation. To adopt this broad of an
interpretation would mean that every single
case would involve a testimonial statement; in
an ex post view, if the prosecution attempts to
140

See, e.g.,

ALASKA STAT.

§ 12.65.020(a) (providing for

autopsy where the medical examiner determines that the death
occurred under circumstances that warrant investigation); ARIz.
REV. STAT. § 11-597 (providing for autopsy when medical examiner determines it is in public interest); ARK. CODE § 12-12315(a)(1)(A) (providing myriad reasons for autopsies beyond
criminal suspicion); CAL. Gov. CODE § 27491 (providing myriad reasons for autopsies beyond criminal suspicion)); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 19a-406 (same); DEL. CODE § 4707(b) (providing
for autopsy in the public interest); D.C. Code § 5-1409(b)
(same); HAW. REV. STAT. § 841-14 (same); IDAHO CODE § 194301B (same); IND. CODE § 36-2-14-6 (providing for autopsy
in non-criminal situations where the medical examiner deems
an autopsy necessary); IOWA CODE § 331.802 (providing for
autopsy in the public interest, including many enumerated
non- criminal circumstances); KAN. STAT. § 22a-233 (providing
for autopsy where coroner deems one necessary); MAINE REv.
STAT. § 3028(8) (providing for autopsy in the public interest);
MASs. GEN. LAWs 38 §§ 3(1)-(19), 4 (providing for notification
and autopsy in myriad non-criminal contexts); MINN. STAT. §
390.11 (providing for autopsy in the public interest, including
many enumerated non-criminal circumstances); Miss. CODE
§§ 41-61-65(1), 41-61-59 (same); N.H. REV. STAT. 611-B:17
(providing for autopsy where medical examiner deems one
necessary); N.J. STAT. 52:17B-88 (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. §

130A-389(a) (providing for autopsy in the public interest); 63
§ 944 (same); TENN. CODE §§ 38-7-108, 38-7-109
(providing for notification and autopsy in myriad non-criminal
contexts); UTAH CODE § 26-4-6 (providing for autopsy where
medical examiner deems on necessary); VA. CODE § 32.1-285
(providing for autopsy in the public interest); W.V CODE § 6112-10 (same).
OKLA. STAT.

introduce the evidence, the evidence must be
intended for litigation, rendering it testimonial
and therefore barred, absent the testimony of
the party who created the evidence.
The second set of cases, where there is
criminal suspicion but no targeted individual,
is left somewhat indeterminate after Williams.
This confusion comes from the distinction
between Justice Alito's view that the lack of
a particularized suspect renders a report non-

testimonial14 ' and the dissent's view that
only a primary purpose for use in litigation,
rather than in litigation against a particular
suspect, is required to render a report testi-

monial. 1 42

Going forward, the latter argument

seems more likely to prevail. Indeed, arguably,
it did prevail in Williams itself because Justice
Thomas seems to have joined the dissent on
this point.143 Accordingly, this variety of autopsy reports is most safely dealt with in the same
way as the third and final variety.
The third set of cases, exemplified by
Leach and De La Cruz, are those in which there
is both criminal suspicion and an actual suspect, and these are probably the most straightforward. Any argument that such an autopsy
was not testimonial i.e., was not conducted
with the primary purpose of use in criminal

prosecution

is unpersuasive.

Under current

Supreme Court precedent, neither the second
nor third variety of autopsies would be admissible without the testimony of the conducting medical examiner. Even so, as discussed

above, there are compelling reasons why the
Court should be receptive to different ways of
introducing the evidence found in an autopsy
report so long as the means of admission protects defendants' interests as well as (or better than) cross-examination. Here, I suggest
three potential methods of introducing autopsy
141

Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2242 (2012).

142
Id. at 2273-74 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
143
See id. at 2262 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment)
(arguing that the plurality's targeted primary purpose test
"lacks any grounding in constitutional text, in history, or in
logic"); see also id. at 2273 (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("Justice
Thomas rejects the plurality's views for similar reasons as I do,
thus bringing to five the number of Justices who repudiate the
plurality's understanding of what statements count as testimonial.").
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reports of the second and third variety, which
could each apply equally to the first variety if
the non-testimonial argument fails.
First, the possibility of surrogate testimony remains alive, though perhaps not "well.""'
After Bullcoming particularly in light of Justice Sotomayor's concurrence it seems any allowable surrogate testimony would have to be
closely tied to the examiner who conducted the
autopsy. If the testifying witness had in fact
observed or supervised the autopsy in question, it is likely that the Court would be satisfied with his or her testimony. One possibility
for jurisdictions with available resources would
be to videotape the examination room. It ap14 North
pears that at least Florida,1 45 Indiana,"
14
14
8
Carolina, ' North Dakota, and South Carolina14 9 already contemplate photography and
videography to some degree during autopsies.
In so doing, the jurisdiction would provide a
means of admission where testimony is needed
but the conducting examiner is not available
for whatever reason. Another member of the
same lab would be able to view the autopsy after the fact in much the same way as if he or she
had been present during the autopsy, and this
viewing would then qualify the examiner to testify as a proper surrogate. This route has the
virtue of simplicity and efficiency, as it preserves
resources and medical examiners' time. In the
vast majority of autopsy reports, no future testimony will be required, so it would be an incredible burden to require contemporaneous
144
See, e.g., Grabbingthe Bullcoming, supra note 98, at
545-46.
145
See FLA. STAT. § 406.135 (providing for disclosure of

autopsy video and/or audio recordings to certain parties).
146
See IND. CODE 16-39-7.1-3 (providing for disclosure
of autopsy video and/or audio recordings to certain parties).
147
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-389.1 (entitled "Photographs and video or audio recordings made pursuant to
autopsy").
148
See N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-18.18 (providing for
disclosure and use of autopsy photographs or videos to certain
parties for particular reasons).
149
See S.C. CODE § 17-5-535 (providing for disclosure
and use of autopsy photographs or videos to certain parties for
particular reasons, including for use by the prosecutor's office
in pressing charges).

observation by another examiner during each
autopsy just in case examiner testimony were
later needed at trial. Video also allows the lab
to avoid having to guess which exams may result in evidence that will be necessary for later
prosecutions.

This solution would also likely provide
for even better cross-examination fodder than
would the testimony of the conducting examiner were he or she to proceed without the
benefit of the videotape. Medical examiners
conduct hundreds of autopsies per year and it
is incredibly unlikely that an individual medical examiner will remember anything about a
single autopsy conducted months (or longer)
before. Instead, any examiner who testifies
without the aid of video would likely testify
as to what the report says and would claim to
have followed typical lab protocol neither of
which provides much fruit for cross-examination. Indeed, cross-examination in many circumstances is unlikely to effectively protect a

defendant's rights.15 o With or without the ability to cross-examine, the best possible forensic
evidence will only come through rigorous laboratory accreditation standards, vigilant internal
oversight, and inquisitive public organizations.
To the extent that the Court can incentivize or
bolster these three things, it should, but they
are best addressed through legislation, funding, and public scrutiny.
Second, and perhaps more likely to succeed in the Court, the prosecution could attempt the Williams form of introduction. In
short, the prosecution could have an expert testify regarding the cause of death after reviewing
the autopsy report without attempting to introduce the report itself. Such testimony would
be the expert's own opinion, and it should not
be allowed to be used as an end-run around
the Confrontation Clause."
That is to say, a
150

See, e.g., Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2250 (Breyer, J.,

concurring) (noting the ineffectiveness of cross-examination
to root out faulty evidence, and citing studies, concluding that,
"[i]n the wrongful-conviction cases to which this Court has
previously referred, the forensic experts all testified in court
and were available for cross-examination").
151

See id. at 2272 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (cautioning

that this approach would "allow prosecutors to do through
subterfuge and indirection what we previously have held the
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol1/iss1/3
38

Washington College of Law

Fall 2013

16

Allison: Confronting the Dead: The Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause Ju

Criminal Law Practitioner
court must be satisfied that the testimony was
introduced as a permissible expert opinion
relying on foundational, though inadmissible,
evidence, rather than for the truth of the matter
asserted.
Similar to the surrogacy option, the permissible scope of such a procedure is unclear.
All that is known is that the report itself could
not be admitted, and that the expert's testimony as it directly pertains to the report could
not be introduced for the truth of the matter
asserted. Defense counsel will undoubtedly
argue that an autopsy report is more nuanced
than the simple "does this 'match' in your expert opinion" presented in Williams regarding
DNA matching. This added complexity may
confuse the jury and perhaps render a saving
jury instruction impossible. The complexity
also may undermine the expert's ultimate opinion since he or she is only operating from the
written notes of the conducting medical examiner. These types of arguments could force the
Court to confront more directly the parameters
of expert opinion admissibility under the Confrontation Clause, where it is based on forensic
reports.
Another significant and, perhaps, fatal
concern with the admission of such testimony
is that it is not clear that it sufficiently protects
defendants' rights. Unlike the video option presented above, the defendant is not afforded an
opportunity to confront the specially-informed
examiner (i.e., one who has reviewed the tape
of the report in question) and instead is stuck
with the worst possible scenario: an expert who
relies entirely on the report itself, without any
requirement of personal knowledge as to the
lab in question, the conducting examiner, or
how the particular autopsy report was created.
Furthermore, though the report itself is ostensibly not admitted, as the discussion above (as
well as the discussion in Williams) makes clear,
it is nearly impossible to disentangle assumptions about the veracity and reliability of the
substance of the report from jury's minds once
it has been discussed, even tangentially, by the

expert. Accordingly, the video option is far superior, and the Court should be very reluctant
to expand the first theory of Williams to other
contexts.
Finally, there is the least realistic (from
a current "five-votes" perspective) but potentially appealing proposition raised very briefly
by Justice Breyer in Williams. He argued that
there might be room for state regulation where
the evidence at issue is not particular testimonial statements that occupy a "constitutional
heartland" described by Crawford.1 2 In particular, he argued "the states could create an exception that presumptively would allow introduction of DNA reports from accredited crime
laboratories."
However, this presumption
would vanish where "there [is] significant reason to question a laboratory's technical competence or its neutrality."5 3 Though it is unclear
to what extent his argument was conditioned
on a determination that DNA profiles were not
testimonial, his brief argument arguably distinguished between "core" testimonial and other
testimonial evidence, and states could regulate
the latter. It is also unclear whether Justice
Breyer would expand this practice beyond DNA
laboratories. Despite the uncertainties, there is
much to support Justice Breyer's idea.
If done properly, both prosecutors and
defendants could benefit from this approach.
First, prosecutors would appreciate clarity and
ease of introduction of often- vital forensic evidence, as compared to the current uncertain
approach. There would be no danger of the
court flatly barring important evidence; rather, it
would be introduced when the testing lab lived
up to the accreditation standards. If the lab did
not, the prosecution would still have an opportunity to present testimony sufficient to introduce the evidence. Additionally, lab accreditation and monitoring would not unduly burden
the state from a resource perspective, because if
a state chooses to operate its own labs there can
be no argument of unfairly draining resources.
The labs would simply be required to meet the
standards of good practice established by stat-

152
See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2248 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
Id.
153
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he is unable to marshal four votes on divisive
issues), the Court may make a significant shift
Defendants, on the other hand, would in its forensic report Confrontation Clause juhave a better way to attack the reliability of risprudence. Justice Breyer's suggestion, if
technicians and tests than cross-examination. fleshed out and properly implemented, could
In making the argument for cross-examination, satisfy both prosecutor-friendly pragmatists
defendants have pointed out the many exam- (particularly Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
ples of labs around the country that have sig- Alito) and defendant-friendly Justices (Justices
nificant internal problems regarding storage, Kagan and Sotomayor). Combined with the
labeling, and testing of physical evidence.15 4 In fact that any new Justices are very unlikely to
Melendez-Diaz, amici argued that cross-exami- be as chained to "history" as Justice Scalia, Jusnation is necessary because "forensic laborato- tice Breyer's suggestion could presage what a
ries are not even required to maintain accredi- differently-comprised Court will do long term.
tation with a standard-bearing organization."5 5
If accreditation were required, stringent, and
V Conclusion
closely monitored, defendants and defense
The Supreme Court should temper its
counsel should be pleased.
approach to granting Confrontation Clause
Though this approach is certainly un- cases as long as it retains an unwillingness (or
realistic with the current composition of the inability) to answer important questions of law
Court, developments in the next few presiden- and give sufficient guidance to the criminal
tial terms may change the outlook. The Court's
justice system. The current state of the law,
current quagmire on Confrontation Clause after Williams a case with no apparent majorquestions in forensic report cases is largely ity opinion"
is untenably vague, confusing,
traceable to Justice Scalia: by authoring the and uninformative for prosecutors, defendants,
majority in Crawford he took the Court away and trial judges. But this should not persuade
from reliability concerns, and by authoring the the Court to continue making it worse before it
opinion in4elendez-Diaz (the first of the foren- makes it better.
sic report cases) he arguably enlarged the Confrontation Clause beyond its bounds,5 firmly
Within the next few terms, the Court may
entrenching forensic reports in the uncomfort- be confronted with an opportunity to clarify or
able, unclear, and unwieldy position of having put an outer bound on Confrontation Clause
"testimonial" status. Sometime within the next questions when it addresses what to do with
decade, Justice Scalia will likely leave the Court. the admissibility of autopsy reports. In addiAs he does, he will leave behind at least Justices tion to the rationale of maintaining stability in
Kagan and Sotomayor, who voted with him in the legal process, there is ample reason for the
Bullcoming. But neither of these Justices seems Court to hold that autopsy reports are not teslikely to take up the banner for the formal, "his- timonial or that they may be admitted without
torical" approach that Scalia championed. If the conducting examiner's testimony. The most
Justice Thomas has also left the bench (or if significant hurdle to this holding is the 'historiute and upheld by courts.

154
See generally,Brief for National Innocence Network
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), 2008 WL 2550614.

155
Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Melen-

cal' wing of the Court, and its complete lack of
interest in pragmatic considerations. At least
one commentator has cautioned against the
strict historical approach to autopsy questions
regarding autopsy reports.5 The historical ap-

dez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), 2008 WL

2550612 at *8.

157

156

ing) (stating "[i]n the pages that follow, I call Justice Alito's
opinion 'the plurality,'because that is the conventional term
for it. But in all except its disposition, his opinion is a dis-

See, e.g., felendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 346-47 (Ken-

nedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority, without any
reasoning or supporting authority, stretched the Confrontation
Clause beyond the "conventional witnesses" to which it was
meant to apply).
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See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2265 (Kagan, J., dissent-
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proach does not fit as comfortably in the autopsy case because there is little historical evidence that seems to require confrontation, the
nature of murder prosecution often entails significant delays that seriously risk the unavail-

ability of the examiner, autopsy reports cannot
be re-conducted when a prosecution arises,
and cross-examination of examiners is largely
unhelpful they will almost certainly not have
memory of a particular autopsy and is likely
unnecessary to avoid injustices the Confrontation Clause is designed to prevent.5 9
The Court should retreat from the
blind "historical" track it has taken and provide much-needed clarity to the Confrontation
Clause analysis in cases involving forensic reports this author hopes that the eventual autopsy case will present an appropriate and adequate vehicle to do just that.

Sixth Amendment Originalism, 34 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y
45, 50-52 (2011).
159
See id. (citing David A. Sklansky, Hearsay 's Last
Hurrah,2009 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 40).
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